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Abstract
In this paper we discuss two issues addressed by Stanley in How Pro-
paganda Works: the status of slurs (Section 1) and the notion of posi-
tive propaganda (Section 2). In particular, in Section 1 we argue contra 
Stanley that code words like ‘welfare’ are crucially different from slurs 
in that the association between the lexical item and an additional so-
cial meaning is not as systematic as it is for slurs. In this sense, slurs 
bring about a special kind of propagandistic effect, even if it typically 
concerns informal contexts rather than public debates. In Section 2, 
we consider positive propaganda and its relation to emotional effects. 
For Stanley, positive propaganda relies on the production of emotional 
effects, feature which risks to erode rational debates even if there is a 
good purpose behind. Instead, we argue that positive propaganda can 
work with no appeal to emotions. To this end, we focus on the use of 
‘she’ as the default personal pronoun in academic writing and suggest 
that this measure can count as positive propaganda which rather than 
eroding rational debates by relying on emotional effects, closely re-
sembles affirmative action aimed at counterbalance a pre-existing form 
of injustice and inequality.
Keywords
Slurs, How Propaganda Works, code words, positive propaganda, 
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In How Propaganda Works, Jason Stanley sets the ambitious objective 
of providing a complete explanation of the mechanisms and effects 
of propaganda. The kernel of Stanley’s analysis is the following. In 
the societies characterized by inequalities, people typically devel-
oped self-justifying ideologies, ‘legitimizing myths’ aimed to mask 
inequalities. The flawed ideologies (false beliefs that are resistant to 
available evidence) are a condition for propaganda to catch on. The 
reason why propaganda is so dangerous to liberal democracies is that 
it prevents fair deliberation and equal participation, which are the 
basis of democracy. Stanley discusses different types of propaganda 
and flawed ideologies, although his investigation mainly focuses on a 
the most threatening type of propaganda: ‘undermining demagogu-
ery’, a contribution to public discourse that presents itself as in the 
service of a worthy ideal, while in fact undermining that very ideal. 
Among the many merits of this work, there is the fact that Stanley 
often illustrates the theoretical distinctions he introduces by draw-
ing on a rich set of concrete situations and current topics in the po-
litical debate: from the climate change debate to the 2003 war in 
Iraq, to the reforms of American education etc. The whole book has 
a remarkable interdisciplinary stance, as it assesses the most central 
questions in political philosophy, while resting on an analytic back-
ground. Moreover, it has the uncommon merit of systematically pre-
senting and discussing the work of scholars in philosophy, sociology 
and linguistics from underrepresented groups.
In this paper, we will not go through the main arguments of the 
book. Rather, we will discuss two issues that interested us for inde-
pendent reasons: the status of slurs, on the one hand (Section 1), and 
the notion of positive propaganda, on the other hand (Section 2). 
First we will focus our attention on the fourth chapter, the one dedi-
cated to language mechanisms, and then turn to the third chapter, 
where the notion of ‘positive propaganda’ is assessed. Other parts 
will be touched upon only tangentially.
1 Slurs are special after all
In chapter four, Stanley presents his account of how certain terms 
can serve as propagandistic tools in liberal democracies. Apparently 
innocuous terms that are accepted in discourse and present them-
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selves as ‘reasonable’ (that is, respectful of the perspective of each 
of the parties involved, 94) acquire an additional meaning that is 
politically and socially charged and that can erode reasonableness. 
Stanley’s example is ‘welfare’: its at-issue meaning corresponds to 
something like ‘social assistance from the government’; in addition, 
it also conveys a not-at-issue meaning. This consists both of a certain 
racist content (something along the lines of ‘black people are lazy’, 
as the term ‘welfare’ is often associated with the flawed assumption 
that black people abuse social assistance) and also of a preference or-
dering over worlds in the linguistic context, according to which for 
any black person in the States, worlds in which that person is lazy are 
closer than worlds in which she is not (144–45). Expressions such 
as ‘welfare’ acquire new contents by a mechanism of repeated as-
sociation between words and social meanings (138). This additional 
content gets to be part of the conventional meaning of the term and it 
is typically not-at-issue (therefore, it cannot be directly challenged or 
denied). According to Stanley, slurs work in the same way as expres-
sions such as ‘welfare’. For Stanley a word like ‘kike’ has ‘Jewish’ as 
at-issue meaning and it has a not-at-issue meaning that consists both 
of a certain pejorative content (something like ‘Jewish people are 
greedy’) and of an imposed preference ordering for which for any 
given Jewish person, possible situations in which she is greedy are 
closer than ones in which she is not (146).
In this section, we are particularly interested in Stanley’s treat-
ment of slurs and we will focus on three of his claims: (i) ‘the focus 
philosophers have placed on explicit slurs is misplaced’ (155); (ii) 
‘slurs are not special’ (150) and (iii) ‘words like ‘kike’ have not-at-
issue meanings’ (146). We will claim that in order to maintain (iii), 
(ii)—and possibly (i)—should be dropped.
Let us start from the first point, one that does not strictly con-
cern slurs, but the debate on slurs. Linguists and philosophers in the 
last years have devoted their attention to these expressions. Some ac-
counts of slurs (Camp 2013 for instance) put emphasis on the propa-
gandistic power of slurs, that is, on the idea that slurs do not only 
reflect discriminatory attitudes but they are also able to propagate 
them. For Stanley, the attention devoted to slurs is misplaced be-
cause propagandistic power is not a distinctive feature of slurs and in 
fact slurs might even lack any such property. Stanley’s point is that 
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slurs are so explicitly racist that they could not do any real propa-
ganda, nor do they typically occur in public political debates, at least 
in liberal democracies. As a matter of fact, politicians constantly 
seek terms and expressions that are able to convey politically/socially 
charged additional contents—as slurs do—while being acceptable in 
public discourse. Stanley calls these terms ‘code words’. The term 
‘welfare’ is such an example: it presents itself as reasonable (as it sim-
ply refers to social assistance), but its ‘social meaning’ (see Haslanger 
2013) actually erodes reasonableness as it amounts to something like 
‘black people are lazy’. These code words can be really harmful in 
liberal democracies as, unlike slurs, they are permissible. Therefore, 
according to Stanley, scholars should investigate these code words 
rather than focusing on slurs.
These remarks on the investigation on slurs might be too hasty 
and they may overlook a couple of points. For one thing, even though 
nowadays in liberal democracies slurs are banned from public po-
litical discourse, they are anyway used in many other contexts, that 
are not less apt to shape one’s political view than public discourses. 
Indeed, Stanley himself notices that it may be a sign that a liberal 
democracy is fading if slurs become more acceptable also in political 
discourse (his example is from Hungary, 151), thereby suggesting 
that the presence of slurs in ordinary contexts is not irrelevant for 
political discourse either. When scholars talk about the propagan-
distic power of slurs (even within liberal democracies), they refer to 
the private settings where slurs are in fact employed and such set-
tings are just as effective as public debates in shaping one’s political 
views. As Stanley himself acknowledges ‘Citizens gather to speak 
about politics in all sorts of informal settings (…) [that]guide us in 
our political choices’ (88). Moreover, even though the use of a slur is 
explicitly racist in the sense of being patently racist, the pejorative con-
tent of slurs is analyzed by many authors2 (including Stanley) as not-
at-issue. Even though the discriminatory content conveyed by slurs 
is not implicit3 in the same sense in which some racist content is im-
plicit when politicians talk about ‘work ethic’ while tacitly alluding 
2 For example, Potts 2005, 2007, McCready 2010, Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016.
3 About the explicit/implicit distinction, see i.a. Bach 1994 and Carston 2002. 
For a discussion about how implicit communication relates to ideology see Sbisà 1999.
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to the assumption that black people are lazy, the not-at-issue status of 
the pejorative content of slurs determines particular features of non-
negotiability that have something in common with those of implicit 
allusions or suggestions. In other terms, both the not-at-issue con-
tent of code words in political discourse and the not-at issue content 
of slurs in informal settings are not presented as open to discussion, 
and if the former phenomenon is central to the mechanism of propa-
gandistic speech, the latter is to the formation of prejudicial stances 
towards target groups, which seems to be an essential background 
condition for propaganda to work. As a matter of fact, a well-known 
feature of the pejorative content of slurs, presented and discussed by 
Stanley (148), is that it survives under semantic embeddings and it 
cannot be negated via denial. Observe:
(1) If Jason’s parents are wops, he must be stylish.
(2) A: Is Jason a wop?
 B: No, he isn’t.
Even though ‘wop’ is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional 
in (1), the pejorative content of ‘wop’ survives. Similarly, B’s denial 
is not able to target the pejorative content conveyed by A’s question: 
by uttering ‘No, he isn’t’, B only manages to negate the descriptive 
content, namely that Jason is Italian, but she does not really interfere 
with the derogatory content, which survives. The pejorative content 
of slurs is not easy to assess and if not objected it tends to be imposed 
on the audience. As Sarah Murray describes: ‘not-at-issue [contents] 
(...) are not negotiable, not directly challengeable, and are added [to 
the common ground] even if the at-issue proposition is denied’ (Mur-
ray 2014: 2:9, quoted in Stanley 2015: 135, 158). The point that we 
want to make is that the fact that the derogatory content of epithets 
is not-at-issue—fact that Stanley acknowledges—suffices to make 
slurs propagandistic tools, especially in informal kinds of settings. 
The fact that they are not the only propagandistic tools provided by 
language does not make the investigation on slurs any less interest-
ing. Besides, as we note in passing above, their role outside political 
speech is likely to foster a crucial prerequisite of propaganda, that 
is the presence in society of ‘beliefs that are resistant to the avail-
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able evidence, [and which] must themselves be flawed in some way’ 
(178). In what follows, we will draw a distinction between slurs and 
slurs-like terms and we shall suggest that a satisfactory analysis of the 
former is required in order to understand certain uses of the latter.
Let us now consider the other two points from Stanley: that slurs 
‘are not special’ and that slurs carry a not-at-issue derogatory con-
tent. In the literature, scholars who claimed that slurs are not special 
meant at least two different things. On the one hand, ‘slurs are not 
special’ is taken by Geoff Nunberg as a motto that challenges the idea 
that slurs have a peculiar semantics that lexically encodes deroga-
tory contents, regardless of how this can be achieved (at the level of 
truth-conditions, presuppositions, conventional implicatures, and so 
on). The kind of approach that Nunberg forthcoming suggests, also 
put forward in different ways by Bolinger 2017 and Rappaport ms., 
is a deflationary one: nothing in the semantics of slurs encodes nega-
tive contents, they only arise conversationally. From this perspec-
tive, slurs are just like code words: Nunberg considers the example 
of ‘welfare’, whereas Bolinger proposes the example of ‘cisgender’, 
a term which refers to people whose gender corresponds to their 
biological sex, but at the same time affiliates the speaker to the trans 
community and its allies. ‘Cisgender’ is a code word in that it is as-
sociated with a positive not-at-issue content concerning transgender 
people. Bolinger, Nunberg and Rappaport describe different prag-
matic mechanisms through which certain terms (prototypical slurs, 
code words like ‘welfare’, ‘cisgender’, etc.) get associated with cer-
tain contents, but the core of their proposals is that there is noth-
ing in the lexical meaning of these words which encodes additional 
‘social’ contents: ‘[When a speaker uses the slur ‘chink’]You may be 
able to infer something (...) about what passes for common wisdom 
about the Chinese in his social circle. But none of that is part of the 
content of what he said, whether at-issue or not’.
However, this is not the kind of account that Stanley has in mind, 
as he explicitly favors ‘content theories’ of slurs (151), according to 
which the pejorative content of slurs (and the social meaning of other 
code words) is part of the conventional meaning of the terms. Stan-
ley’s interpretation of the motto ‘slurs are not special’ is that there 
are plenty of terms that are not slurs but have crucially similar fea-
tures. While agreeing with Bolinger, Nunberg and Rappaport on this 
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point, Stanley does not embrace their deflationary analysis, contrari-
wise, that slurs and code words lexically encode not-at-issue content. 
We argue that both Stanley’s and Nunberg’s unified analysis of slurs 
and code words are problematic, as there seems to be a crucial con-
trast between slurs like ‘wop’ or ‘kike’ and code words like ‘welfare’ 
or ‘cisgender’. We will show that if one wants to maintain (iii), that 
slurs lexically encode not-at-issue content, one should drop (ii) and 
(i)—that there is nothing special about slurs and that, because they 
just work like any other code term, the attention dedicated to slurs 
is somehow misplaced. Our point is that, in the case of code words, 
the associated content is not part of the lexically encoded meaning 
and therefore it may fail to feature in some occurrences of the term. 
On the contrary, in the case of slurs, the derogatory content belongs 
to the lexical meaning of the term and it is conveyed in every literal 
use of the slur.4 If we are right, then it should be possible to use code 
words literally, without conveying their associated ‘social’ meaning, 
while it would not be possible to use slurs literally without conveying 
their derogatory content. Consider the following examples:
(3) There are no faggots in the army.
(4) Homosexual men are worthy of contempt because of being 
homosexual.
The occurrence of the homophobic slur ‘faggot’ in (3) is associated 
with homophobic contents along the lines of (4) (or maybe Stanley 
would rather choose something connected to stereotypes, say ‘ho-
mosexual men are effeminate’). The homophobic content conveyed 
by the slur ‘faggot’ cannot be eliminated by stating something that 
4 In this paper we do not assess the issue of appropriation, that could prima fa-
cie look like a counterexample of the claim that literal uses of slurs always convey 
a derogatory content. Even though there is no unanimous account of appropria-
tion, many scholars treat appropriation either (i) as a case of polysemy: therefore 
an appropriated occurrence of a term like ‘fag’ would not count as an occurrence 
of a slurs in the first place (see Ritchie 2017, Jeshion ms.) or (ii) as a case of echoic 
use of language: therefore, an appropriated occurrence of a term like ‘fag’ would 
not count as a literal use of a slur (see Bianchi 2014, Miščević and Perhat 2016, 
Cepollaro 2017a). We are here assuming that appropriative uses are non-literal 
ones (but for an account in terms of speech acts, see Anderson forthcoming). 
Thanks to Dan Zeman for pushing us to clarify this point.
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contradicts its associated derogatory contents, as the offensiveness of 
(5) and (6) show:
(5) Faggots are not contemptible because of being homosexual.
(6) Faggots are not effeminate.
On the contrary, this associated content can be suspended in the 
case of code words. Let’s consider ‘welfare’—taken as an example 
by Stanley 2015 and Nunberg forthcoming—and ‘cisgender’—pro-
posed by Bolinger 2017. It is relatively easy to find non-loaded uses 
of ‘welfare’, as this example from the COCA (Davies 2008) shows:
(7) Eisenhower took his turn with the interstate highway system 
and the creation of the department of health, education and 
welfare.
The codeword ‘cisgender’ behaves in a similar way. Usually, it is as-
sociated with pro-trans-community contents, namely that transgen-
der people have right to respect, full inclusion and equality. How-
ever, if it occurs in an utterance that explicitly expresses a transphobic 
content, the pro-trans-community content usually associated with 
the code word disappears. As a matter of fact, despite the presence of 
the codeword ‘cisgender’, allegedly associated to a positive attitude 
towards the trans community, (8) is nevertheless transphobic:
(8) Only cisgender people should have the right to adopt children.5
We argue that the above examples show that there is a contrast be-
tween slurs and other code words in that the former lexically en-
code what Stanley calls ‘social meaning’, while the latter do not. In 
a Bolinger/Nunberg-like framework, one would maintain (ii)—that 
slurs are not special, they have no exotic or peculiar semantics and 
work like many other code words—and give up (iii)—that slurs 
lexically encode not-at-issue content; on the contrary, in a Potts-like 
perspective, one would maintain (iii) and give up (ii). We think that 
the examples just provided show a contrast between slurs and code 
words that speaks in support of the latter option.
In conclusion: we agree with Stanley about implicit messages 
5 Some of these issues, including the contrast between slurs and non-slurring 
code words,are discussed in the PhD thesis Cepollaro 2017b.
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being particularly dangerous and apt to convey pernicious contents 
in a propagandistic manner. Stanley’s analysis of code words like 
‘welfare’ illustrates very well their power and explains why politi-
cians constantly try to come up with terms that could on occasion 
function like slurs but are not banned from public debate. Howev-
er, we believe that code words are crucially different from slurs in 
that the association between the lexical item and an additional social 
meaning is not as systematic as it is for slurs. In this sense, slurs are 
special after all and do have a special kind of propagandistic power, 
even if it typically concerns informal contexts rather than public de-
bates. A satisfactory analysis of prototypical slurs can shed light on 
the mechanisms at play when non-slurring words are used as slurs.
2 Positive propaganda
In this section we will focus on the distinctions introduced by Stan-
ley between different kinds of propaganda. In particular, we are in-
terested in the notion of positive propaganda and its connection to 
emotional import and effects. We will try to show how positive pro-
paganda need not rely on emotional effects.
The main danger that demagoguery—that is the kind of propa-
gandistic speech Stanley is interested in—poses in liberal societies 
is to undermine the democratic values that it purports to champion. 
For Stanley demagoguery does not require insincerity, in that a dem-
agogue can be sincere in his or her effort to attract political support 
through rhetoric, and it does not require falsity, since the aspect of 
communication that is responsible for the undermining is typically 
not part of the truth-functional content—as seen in the previous 
section with respect to the not-at-issue content of code words and 
slurs (41). However, demagoguery does require (i) the essential in-
volvement of emotional aspects apt to impinge on rational debate and 
possibly unify opinions (in line with the classical sense of propagan-
da, 48), and (ii) the masking of its ‘real’ goals—that is, demagogic 
speech looks like supporting an ideal (in particular, reasonableness) 
while in facts eroding it. For both of those elements—emotional 
import and masking—to work as gears of the mechanism of propa-
ganda, the presence in society of flawed ideologies is an essential 
prerequisite, along with their roots in the inequalities that they tend 
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to perpetuate. The tight connection between the epistemic deficien-
cies that flawed ideologies carry along (typically, beliefs resistant to 
evidence and unjustified connections) and the mechanism of propa-
ganda suggests that propagandistic speech may be wrong per se. How-
ever, Stanley rebuts such a ‘Kantian’ criticism of propaganda as an 
inherently bad practice, on the ground that an appeal to emotions 
in public discourse is often indispensable to improve reasonableness 
in public debate, and hence may be a way to ‘address rational will’ 
rather than diminishing it (114). As much as ‘negative’ propaganda 
fosters lack of respect towards targeted groups, by indirectly repre-
senting them as non-worthy of respect, ‘positive’ propaganda—that 
is ‘civic rhetoric’, in Stanley’s terms (82)—enables an emotional ma-
nipulation that aims at creating empathy towards minorities, which 
would be otherwise left out as party to the public debate. Thus, civic 
rhetoric is a means to implement the ideal of reasonableness in liberal 
democracy and works in opposition to negative propaganda, which 
masks itself as encoding the ideal of reasonableness, but actually 
erodes it by fostering prejudices against targeted groups.
Stanley seems to suggest that ‘positive’ propaganda is always a 
form of supporting propaganda, rather than a form of undermining 
propaganda—i.e., a speech that is presented as an embodiment of 
certain ideals, and ‘tends to increase the realization of those very 
ideals by either emotional or other nonrational means’, rather than 
a speech that ‘tends to erode those very ideals’ (53). This is true 
both of the main theoretical example of civic rhetoric that Stanley 
makes—Du Bois’ theorization of a propagandistic ‘Negro art’ im-
proving the empathy of whites for Afro-Americans—and of the 
various examples he takes from contemporary events—such as stark 
warnings against smoking on cigarettes (58–9), Coltrane’s version 
of My Favorite Things, and the Selma Montgomery March (64, 
114). As we have already hinted at, the reason why undermining 
propaganda is in some sense always at risk of threatening liberal de-
mocracies seems to lie in its essential connection with the epistemic 
deficit that comes with flawed ideologies. The emotional import of 
propagandistic speech has the effect of cutting off options that should 
be rationally considered for political deliberation (70), and this may 
erode rational debate, even when there is a good purpose behind.
Stanley recognizes that supporting propaganda can be flawed, as 
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in the case of the representation of the Aryan supremacy in the Nazi 
regime, or—outside of the political realm and within liberal democ-
racies—as in the case of advertising that exploits a flawed ideology 
that links material possession with aesthetic worth. However, there 
seems to be a tension between his claim that positive propaganda is 
necessary in contemporary liberal democracies, given their imper-
fect form, and the claim that the core mechanism at play of positive 
propaganda is still the emotional effect that not-at-issue-content can 
provide—which potentially can lead to curb rational deliberation. 
Again, we think that the relevance of discourse outside the politi-
cal sphere has been pushed too much in the background. Consider 
the use of ‘she’ as the default personal pronoun in recent academic 
(and more at large ‘educated’) writing. Is there a propagandistic 
mechanism involved? And is it plausible to construe the not-at-issue 
content as an emotional element? It seems hard to answer ‘no’ to 
the first question. After all, it is a linguistic choice motivated by the 
will of overcoming a situation of inequality. On the interpretation 
of the situation we favor, the linguistic use aims at dismantling the 
fostering of discriminatory stance with respect to women, by creat-
ing the expectation that the interlocutor at issue is a woman. If this 
analysis is on the right track, a typical propagandistic mechanism 
(by Stanley’s own light) is at work here: using ‘she’ as the default 
personal pronoun is a way to ‘smuggle’ a not-at-issue content in the 
common ground, namely the expectation that the person at stake is 
a woman. More dubious is to maintain that the not-at-issue content 
here is emotional, and that its central aim is creating empathy to-
wards the targeted group (women). Our claim is not that this use of 
‘she’ never carries an emotional element of empathy, but only that 
such an emotional element, if and when present, is not crucial to 
the rhetorical strategy to be effective. Indeed, the process of updat-
ing the conversational common ground seems to happen regardless of 
any emotional elements which may happen to be associated with the 
linguistic maneuver. Suppose that a speaker feels hostile emotions to-
wards the elicited expectation that the subject at stake is a woman.6 
6 This could happen to be the case for any reason: say, the speaker supports 
the anti-discriminatory intention behind the rhetorical use of ‘she’, but she is 
displeased by the rhetorical strategy itself, or she just hates to consider women as 
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The use of ‘she’ as the default personal pronoun succeeds in creating 
an expectation that the subject at stake is a woman, which is just 
what it does in ordinary language, despite the emotional effect that 
it produces in the interlocutor. Empathy with the targeted group is 
definitely an element that does not disrupt the rhetoric effect, but it 
is not something in virtue of which the effect of creating the expecta-
tion is reached. The expectation is created merely in virtue of how 
presuppositions7 work in ordinary language.
It is worth noting that there are positive and negative forms of 
discrimination, which are somehow orthogonal to the positive and 
negative forms of propaganda. Positive forms of discrimination can 
be supporting, as in the case of affirmative action laws, and can be 
undermining, or better deterrent, as in the case of a law that prohib-
its driving for those who do not possess a license (that proves their 
capability of driving in a safe way for the rest of society). Analo-
gously, negative forms of discrimination can be supporting, as in the 
case of a selecting committee that opts for a candidate for qualities 
unrelated to the criteria of selection, and they can be deterrent, as in 
the case of unfairly denying same treatment to an individual because 
of their gender or race (those are the cases that are more likely to be 
understood as ‘default’ discrimination cases, given the ordinary con-
notations the term bears). Given this taxonomy, the use of ‘she’ as 
default pronoun seems to be a rhetorical means to foster positive and 
supportive discrimination with respect to women. Although the not-
at-issue content can carry emotional elements, it does not seem plau-
sible to maintain that they are crucial for the linguistic mechanism to 
work. The systematic use of ‘she’ as the default pronoun looks like a 
form of positive supporting propaganda, that, rather than exploiting 
an emotional effect like in Stanley’s examples, has more in common 
with certain kinds of affirmative action. Consider for instance the 
so-called ‘gender quotas’, aimed at increasing women’s representa-
tion and participation in decision making bodies at executive or leg-
islative levels. This measure constitutes a form of discrimination that 
is employed (and deemed legitimate at least by the governments that 
potential interlocutors.
7 For a presuppositional account of gender features of pronouns, see Cooper 
1983 and recently Del Prete and Zucchi 2017.
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adopt it) in order to counterbalance a state of affairs where women 
are severely underrepresented. It would be absolutely unacceptable 
in a fair society, where sexist ideologies were not widespread. These 
kinds of initiatives count as positive discrimination (whether they 
are supporting or not is a matter of debate) and possibly as positive 
propaganda, but they do not seem to exploit emotional aspects (nor 
do they impinge on rational debate in this way). In this sense, we 
find that the systematic use of ‘she’ in academic writing could well 
be among the instances of propaganda that interest Stanley, but argu-
ably it would not be analyzed in terms of emotional effects; on the 
contrary, it closely resembles affirmative action such as gender quo-
tas, discriminatory measures aimed at counterbalance a pre-existing 
form of injustice and inequality. Insofar as the creation of a new ex-
pectation (i.e., that the interlocutor is a woman) is per se effective in 
contrasting the discriminatory stances that are associated with the 
traditional non-egalitarian expectation (i.e., that the interlocutor is a 
man), we do not have reasons to assume that emotional elements are 
essentially attached to the rhetorical move.
In conclusion, in this paper we offered a few remarks on two 
points of Stanely’s remarkable book on propaganda. In the first sec-
tion we argued that code words are crucially different from pro-
totypical slurs and that slurs are special after all, as they do have a 
special kind of propagandistic power, even if it typically concerns 
informal contexts rather than public debates. In the second section, 
we have focused on different kinds of propaganda and considered 
an instance of positive propaganda that does not seem to rely on the 
exploitation of emotional mechanisms, namely the systematic use of 
‘she’ as default personal pronoun in academic writing.8
8 We would like to thank Jason Stanley for his replies, Dan Zeman for putting 
together this symposium, and two anonymous referees for their insightful 
suggestions. Bianca Cepollaro acknowledges the support of the Labex and Idex 
grants anr-10-labx-0087 iec, anr-10- idex-0001-02 psl*, and project mineco 
ffi2012-37658, as well as the project PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014 (in particular 
BI-Mestre-PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014 and PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014-
SEM). Giuliano Torrengo wishes to thank the project 2015-0746 (15-5-3007000-
601) of Fondazione Cariplo and Regione Lombardia, and project 15-6-3007000-
2021 of Università degli Studi di Milano for financial supports.
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